Book Reviews

Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the European Union and the Middle East

Various scholars have analyzed Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era from different angles. The changes in Turkish foreign policy, in line with the 1989 structural transformation, were important both for foreign policy analysts and for scholars working on International Relations theory. This book is a timely addition to this literature with its in-depth analysis and theoretical angle. Equally important is that since the end of the Cold War the academic community has become more receptive to the problems in the Middle East, the formulation of common foreign policy in the EU, and ethnic based violence in the Middle East. As a result, understanding such changes in foreign policy has become an object of scientific inquiry.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been confronted with significant challenges coming from the process of European integration, with the EU making its quantum leap into a political union, as well as turmoil in the Middle East. Particularly important in that realm were the emerging questions over Turkey's continuing role in the Western alliance and the European order. These challenges led to the formulation of three questions: First, is Turkey adjusting its foreign policy objectives in the post-1989 period? Second, is there a reformulation of Turkish foreign policy to cope with these new challenges and if so, what kind of foreign policy changes are we looking at? And third, what kind of impact has the EU had on Turkish foreign policy, if any?

Mesut Özcan seeks answers to these questions by looking at the impact of the EU on Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has been an associate member of the European Community/EU since 1963, applied for full membership in 1987, became a candidate in 1999 and began its accession negotiations in 2005. As a result of the increasing ties between Turkey and the EU, one would expect to see a change in Turkish foreign policy in line with European norms and procedures. Özcan aims to uncover these dynamics between Turkey and the EU with an attempt to assess whether there has been a Europeanization of foreign policy. This is a highly challenging task for the following reasons: First, Europeanization as a theoretical construct is used for changes in policy making with regard to first pillar issues and its application to the analysis of foreign policy even for the EU member states is relatively new as there is no single set of rules that would apply to second pillar issues. Second, it is even harder to analyze the Europeanization of foreign policy among candidate countries. Özcan rises to this daunting task by his analysis of two case studies in Turkish foreign policy: the Iraqi issue and the Israeli-Palestinian problem. He also uses a novel approach by linking Turkey's EU candidacy to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and by doing so provides interesting linkages.

Özcan looks at the decision-making procedures in Turkey in detail and analyzes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in line with European foreign policy. The first part of his book is on the process of European integration, the emergence of a common foreign policy—the CFSP and the Europeanization process. The analysis here is important because it provides the theoretical basis with which the main aim of the book—the harmonization of Turkish foreign policy—will be explored. Özcan provides a clear summary of these developments in the European integration process. As noted above, this is also relatively uncharted territory as the emergence of a European common foreign policy is recent and subject to the tensions that emerge from the clashing interests of the member states. Therefore, it is important to point out that the Europeanization of foreign policy is also a new phenomenon for the EU itself. The book reads like a dissertation in certain sections and it would have been better to edit these sections out. Nonetheless, it provides a concise summary of the evolution of the EU's CFSP and points out some of the problems in the building of a European foreign policy.

In the second part of the book, Özcan applies his main findings on Europeanization and the harmonization of foreign policy to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East by focusing on Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian problem. His main findings are interesting as they illustrate that there is a change in the Turkish foreign policy makers' perceptions towards Europe and the Middle East. In addition, his findings illustrate that country-specific conditions, such as geographical location, cultural and historical factors, matter in setting the limits of Europeanization. This is also a unique contribution to the field of European foreign policy in general. The book provides compelling evidence for the harmonization of Turkish foreign policy in line with the EU accession process in one of the most complex areas of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East.

All in all, this book constitutes an important contribution to the literature on Europeanization as well as Turkish foreign policy.

Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Sabancı University*

Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership?

By *Ömer Taşpınar* and *Philip H. Gordon*
Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, 115pp., ISBN 9780815732150.

In recent years, relations between Turkey and the United States have been tumultuous. This is in contrast with a half century of exemplary cordial relations between Turkey and the U.S. as close allies and strategic partners. Despite differences on the Cyprus issue and discussions on the Armenian question, relations remained friendly and cooperative. The US supported Turkey's bid for EU membership, helped Turkey during

its economic crisis, defended Turkey's right to self-defense during its long lasting conflict with the PKK, and also designated this organization as a terrorist group. Meanwhile, Turkey backed the US foreign policy in the region, played an important role during the Cold War as a bulwark against the spread of communism, participated in the first Gulf war, allowed US bases to exist on its soil, and supported the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. However, this harmonious relationship has recently become unstable. Differences emerged as mutual trust and cooperation waned during the war against Iraq for a number of reasons. First, the US decision to invade Iraq was confronted with massive protests around the world and in Turkey. Turkish people vehemently opposed the war on humanitarian, political, and economic grounds. Parallel to this opposition to the war, the Turkish government started negotiations with the US on the reimbursement for the potential economic costs and political consequences of supporting the war in Iraq. However, the government failed to obtain support from the Turkish parliament, and the relevant resolution failed to pass when it was tabled on March 1st, 2003. After this failure, despite conciliatory statements of both the U.S. and Turkish heads of the government, relations between the U.S. and Turkey never fully recovered. The rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey and the arrest of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq in July of the same year led to further deterioration of relations. In the US media and policy circles, "Who lost Turkey?" became a commonplace question. The reason for this weakening of the traditional U.S.–Turkish alliance is the subject of much debate: for some, it is the failure of public diplomacy,

for others, it is merely political posturing, and for others it is because the parties could not fulfill their respective promises.

Ömer Taşpınar and Phillip H. Gordon in their book entitled *"Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership?"* offer ways to overcome past grievances and improve Turkish-U.S. relations, so as to win back Turkey.

The book begins with a historical overview of Turkey's westernization process. In the first part of the book, the authors explain the roots of Turkish society's westernization and the further political and social reform after the establishment of the Turkish Republic based on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's vision of a modern Turkey. In the next three parts of the book, Turkey's relations with regional and global powers are analyzed. Here, Taşpınar and Gordon discuss the ongoing crisis between the US and Turkey. They place an onus on the March 1st crisis, its connection to the Iraq War, and the implications for Northern Iraq. From this specific area of discord, contentions spread to other political areas. Turkey's initiatives in its foreign policy were questioned by the U.S. and the West. A case in point is, Turkey's new Middle East policy of "zero-problem with neighbors" and its increasing engagement with the Arab world, independent of the United States. In particular, the Turkish government's overt and expressed critique of Israel's actions in Gaza in addition to Turkey's engagement with Syria and Iran have disturbed its long-time Western allies. For Turkey, the US policy in Northern Iraq and the US administration's handling of the Armenian question in the US Congress have put Turkey on its guard. According to Taşpınar and Gordon, the

relations between the US and Turkey may, therefore, continue to remain tense in the future, and not automatically return to the earlier period of business as usual.

In the second part of this section, Taşpınar and Gordon discuss Turkey's 40 year old effort to integrate into the European Union. After a brief introduction about the nature of relations between the EU and Turkey, they discuss the development of relations since the Helsinki Summit and the beginning of the EU accession negotiations. They indicate that Turkey has grown increasingly frustrated by the obstacles the EU has placed before its integration since the onset of the negotiations. Today, the polls demonstrate that the EU's popularity among Turkish society has decreased to the extent that the Turkish people have grown suspicious of the membership process and the EU's motivations for stalling it.

According to the authors, the deterioration of relations with the US and the EU has put into question the traditional pro-Western policy orientation of Turkey. Several different alternatives have emerged as potential new routes for Turkish foreign policy. Among these, Taşpınar and Gordon analyzed the newly emerging neo-nationalist political movement and its foreign policy strategy of "Eurasianism." Although "Eurasianism" cannot compare with Turkey's long standing strategic, political, economic, and social ties with the Western world, the fact that it has become a topic of discussion reveals a certain exhaustion among the Turkish population towards its pro-Western stance. On another level, the five years of economic and political stability in Turkey has produced confidence among Turkish people, which has given them the courage to seek a more autonomous position in the international arena.

In the final part of the book, Taşpınar and Gordon offer several different ways to "win back Turkey." They recommend some important policy changes to rebuild mutual trust and cooperation between all parties involved, the U.S., Turkey, and the EU. These measures are intended to be a roadmap for the new U.S. administration. These recommendations include changes in Kurdish policy in Turkey; the need for the US and the EU to develop a serious policy on the issue of the PKK, continuous support for the liberalization and democratization process in Turkey, a solution of the Armenian question, the revitalization of the EU process, and an end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus.

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The Armenian Rebellion at Van

By *Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taskiran* and *Ömer Turan*
Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006, pp. 266, ISBN 0874808707.

Devoid of rhetorical embellishment, this work challenges some traditional notions about the tragic history of both the Muslim and Armenian people of the Ottoman eastern Anatolian province of Van. It is a balanced contribution to a field of

study that in the past has often been affected by nationalist agendas and emotionally charged discourses.

After detailed and sometimes boring information on the geography, climate, inhabitants, agriculture, education, industry and commerce in the city and province of Van, the moving parts of the book begin with the third chapter, where the political and sociological contextualization is provided. Here it is argued that the misfortunes of raided villages were not purely Armenian troubles. Tribes and bandits of the province did not discriminate among targets by religion and the suffering was not sectarian. Furthermore, the Ottoman government and the Armenians were not natural antagonists, because it was in the interest of the Ottomans to safeguard them, as well as the settled Muslims, if only to continue collecting their taxes. In contrast, the Kurdish tribes and the government were natural antagonists, considering tribal-state relationships *per se*. Contrary to an often portrayed two sided conflict, we see a complex picture, where the sides change depending of the interpreter, the conflict becoming Turkish-Armenian, Turkish-Kurdish, Kurdish-Armenian, Ottoman-Russian or Christian-Muslim. But, while expressing the often confused and contradictory nature of Ottoman policy, the authors remain careful not to downplay the cases of extreme brutality and destruction that the Turkish military and Kurdish tribes imposed on the Armenians.

Exploring the acts of Armenian revolutionaries in the three main rebellions of 1896, 1908 and 1915, the book portraits horrible examples of rebellious terror. And still, Ottomans were decidedly lenient in punishing political dissent. Comparing European tactics of fighting rebels in colonies, like those used by the British in India or the French in North Africa, the authors present the double standard of European powers when it comes to judging Ottoman counteractions to terror. They did not allow the Ottomans the tools that they themselves used to put down revolt, although Europeans were imposing colonial rule on majorities, whereas the Ottomans were attempting to protect the majority against a distinct minority, the Armenian rebels. So, the handicap of the Ottoman state in effectively fighting the rebels was not only scarcity of money. Stating that disunity hampered effective governance, the authors point to another factor, the centuries-old Ottoman policy of dividing power in the provinces between the military and the civilian authorities, whose conflicts caused the government to speak with many voices.

Another quarrel tying the hands of officials was Russian support. Russians rendered great assistance to the rebels by applying rules of extraterritoriality in their favor. Revolutionaries who were Russian subjects were not punished because of the *en force* accepted principle that subjects of European states could not be tried in Ottoman courts. With the outbreak of World War I, the Russian factor in Armenian rebellious activity became more obvious. In fact, Dashnaktsutiun, the strongest among Armenian revolutionary parties in Anatolia, was officially founded in 1890 in Russian Transcaucasia. Openly welcoming the prospect of a Russian occupation of the Eastern Anatolia, thousands of Ottoman Armenians went to Russian territory to be trained in partisan tactics and integrated into the Russian im-

perial forces as members of the Armenian Legions, the *druzhiny* units. The rebels realized very late that they had been betrayed when, after the final Russian conquest of Van in September 1915, the Russians began to disarm Armenians, dissolve the *druzhiny*, etc. The Russians had no intention of creating an Armenia in Anatolia at all, but planed to settle Russian and Cossack colonists there and therefore concurred in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which gave Van to Russia, not to an Armenia.

The authors provide intricate and detailed discussions of the hostility and cruelty caused by Armenian nationalists relying on Russian support. By arguing that the Ottoman regime never formulated a plan to annihilate its Armenian subjects, the authors disagree with most previous Armenian scholarship on the matter. A form of non-partial evidence, especially the reports of British consuls in Van, is used *en masse* to describe rebellious activities, instead of the usual Turkish state accounts.

This can be counted as a shortcoming of the book. Ottoman documents of the Prime ministerial Archives (BOA) were purely internal reports and had no foreseeable political or diplomatic benefit, and therefore, are more reliable sources in contrast to consular reports etc. Beside the ATASE (Military) Archives, which are not easily open to public and therefore cannot be examined, the authors used BOA documents only in Chapter 5 in narrating the short governorship of 'Ali Riza Pasha' in ten pages, but they got it wrong. The governor to be killed by Armenian revolutionaries in Batum in November 1907 was not Ali Riza Pasha, but Adliyeci Âli Bey. And the former was also not even a Pasha, but Ali Riza "Bey". The

book is -as almost all secondary accounts are- confused about these two names who followed each other in governorship of Van. But one has to carefully dig up when writing ten pages about a governor, otherwise these pages can become garbage. The only other use of BOA documents is to be seen at Chapter 7, to explain the assassination of the Armenian Mayor of Van in two pages.

The most important data needed when writing on the Armenian issue is to be found in the *Dahiliye* section of BOA, which was not even touched by the authors of this book. To show the relevance and give just one example, I would like to mention the telegram sent by Tahsin, the governor of Van, to Talat, the Minister of the Interior, on August 25, 1914. Answering an inquiry of Talat, the governor mentions that no Armenian crossed the border to Russia or Iran, and the Armenians of Van do not have feelings of dispute or rebellion against the government. Moreover, he writes that the Dashnaks will help the government in the war ("*Seferberlikten evvel ve sonra Van vilayeti Ermeni ailelerinden Rusya'ya İran'a hicret ve firar etmiş kimse yoktur. Bura Ermenilerinde hükumete karşu öyle bir fikr-i ihtilal ve ihtilaf da yoktur. Bilakis Daşnaklarda seferberlik ve tekâlif-i harbiye münasebetiyle hükumete muzâheret ve muavenet görülüyor.*" BOA, DH.EUM. 2.Şb. 1/31, 1332 L 3) This and many other documents of BOA had to be used in a book arguing that thousands of Ottoman Armenians went to Russian territory to be trained in partisan tactics and integrated into the Russian imperial forces as members of the Armenian Legions, the *druzhiny* units.

Beside these shortcomings, *The Armenian Rebellion at Van* constitutes a welcome

contribution to scholarship on the late phase of the Ottoman state and her policy toward Armenians. The authors should be especially commended for attempting to clear this scholarly discourse from many of the emotional and political overtones that have characterized it in the past. The authors present a documented account that displays both historical accuracy and compassion regarding the tragic history of both the Christian and Muslim populations of Van.

In addition to highlighting the unfortunate fate of the inhabitants of the province, this work is also a further contribution towards a richer understanding of the complex nature of revolutions, especially the lost ones. In light of the massive historiography on WWI, it is quite an achievement in itself to document a largely forgotten episode of this huge conflict.

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Blood, Beliefs and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 2007-2009

Robert Olson has been a pioneering and prolific scholar of Kurdish nationalism. In *Blood, Beliefs and Ballots*, he analyzes Kurdish political activism and the Turkish state's attempts to manage this activism between the July 2007 parliamentary and 2009 local elections in Turkey. Olson extensively documents political developments during this period on the basis of interviews he personally conducted, news sources in Turkish, and secondary literature. The fact that Olson gives voice to a variety of actors ranging from the Turkish political elite to Kurdish nationalists to liberals substantially enriches the book. He convincingly demonstrates how increasing political pluralism and competition in Turkey makes the Turkish political elite and Kurdish nationalists develop new positions. Interestingly, these actors may adopt more moderate and radical stances depending on the nature of

criticisms and political competition they are faced with.

His main arguments can be summarized in four points. First, the language issue has become central to the Kurdish question in Turkey (pp. 12, 41-44, 227). While Kurdish nationalists occasionally put forward territorially oriented demands such as the proposal of dividing Turkey into autonomous regions (p. 99), their most consistent demand has been the allocation of public resources to Kurdish education. At minimum, they have demanded that Kurdish be taught as an optional language in public education. The Turkish political elite appear to be unwilling to meet this demand, and have instead opted for policies to erode popular support for Kurdish nationalists. Second, the Turkish political elite have aimed to counter the challenge of Kurdish nationalisms mainly through economic and religious appeals,

military operations, and improved relations with the Iraqi Kurds. In this regard, the priorities and policy preferences of the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) government and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been very similar (pp.22-23, 68). They have been unwilling to recognize Kurdish political rights and address widespread human rights violations. Additionally, the TAF has appeared to be content with the AKP and the Gülen movement's appeal among the Kurds, and has perceived organized Islam as an antidote against the Kurdish nationalist movement. Olson also argues that the Turkish state decided to develop close relations with the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) in Iraq, especially after a PKK cross-border incursion resulted in the deaths of 17 Turkish soldiers on October 3, 2007 (pp. 114-117).

Third, Olson's narrative also makes it clear that the AKP has failed to capitalize on its success in the 2007 parliamentary elections and to develop a consistent policy that expands the scope of political rights and civil liberties. The AKP hoped that its populist policies, including distribution of cash and white goods, and its reliance on Islamic networks would be sufficient for victory in the 2009 local elections (p. 193). The Kurdish nationalist party, the DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*), responded to the AKP by pursuing a campaign centered on Kurdish identity and portraying the local elections as a referendum on the fate of the Kurdish nationalist movement (pp. 192-193). This strategy was partially successful and the DTP managed to win in more municipalities in 2009 than in the 2004 local elections. Consequently, the growing influence of more liberal Turkish and Kurdish voices neither

resulted in democratic changes in the state's Kurdish policy nor lead to the widespread Kurdish condemnation of PKK violence. Nonetheless, the judicial case against the "Ergenekon conspiracy" has demonstrated the limits to military's political autonomy. It is an important step in ending the culture of impunity that pervaded the security forces during their fight against Kurdish nationalists (pp. 123-136). Finally, Olson's analysis is informative in outlining how the Kurdish question in Turkey is closely linked with regional developments and changes in international affairs. In particular, the evolution of relations among Turkey, the US, and the KRG greatly affects the strategies of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey (pp. 232-234).

The book would benefit from two additions. First, a section comparing the recent events with the period between the capture of Öcalan in February 1999 and the 2007 elections would be helpful to develop a comparative perspective and directly address several significant questions. What have been the continuities and changes in the Turkish political elite's attempt to counter the challenge of Kurdish nationalism? How have Kurdish nationalists responded to Turkey's diminishing prospects for membership in the EU and the consolidation of an embryonic Kurdish state in Iraq? How do interactions between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists affect each other's platforms? Second, Kurdish Islamists deserve a more comprehensive treatment. They are the only force other than the secular Kurdish nationalist movement with mass mobilizing capacity in the Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey. They are not just pawns in the Turkish political elites' project of man-

aging Kurdish nationalism and are highly critical of Turkish Islamic movements for being insensitive to the Kurdish suffering. The Kurdish Islamists have autonomous organizational bases with substantial grassroots support and pursue their own ideological goals. For instance, they organized a huge rally in Diyarbakır in support of Hamas on January 4, 2009. Not surprisingly, the PKK and its ancillary organizations are greatly concerned with the Kurdish Islamists' influence and the competition between two forces has occasionally turned violent. In this context, it is important to analyze the broader implications of the competition between Kurdish secular and Islamist nationalists.

The real value of *Blood, Beliefs and Ballots* lies in its successful portrayal of the diversity of the positions participating in the extensive public debate about the Kurdish question in Turkey. This book makes it clear that neither the Turkish state nor the Kurdish nationalist movement is a homogenous entity pursuing well-defined and rigid political agendas. The interaction among the Turkish and Kurdish political actors and their attempts to influence public opinion in Turkey and international actors remains central to any scholarly understanding of the contemporary evolution of the Kurdish question.

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Turkish Politics in a Changing World, Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations

By *E. Fuat Keyman* and *Ziya Öniş*
Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2007, 342 pp., ISBN 9786053990055.

Turkish Politics in a Changing World, consisting of articles written by Keyman and Öniş discusses Turkey's political process without ignoring the significance of external dynamics. It therefore examines the changes and transformations brought about by Turkey's modernization and democratization processes under the influence of regional and global developments by paying particular attention to the interactions of local, regional, global agents and dynamics.

Keyman and Öniş put forward the argument that Turkey constitutes an important case for studying alternative modernization paths in the post-9/11 period in which the discourse of "clash of civilizations" – regarding Islam as an antithesis of modernity and liberal democracy – is determinant. On the one hand, they consider Turkey to be successful in establishing an infrastructure of modernity. On the other hand, they emphasize Turkey's failure in making modernity democracy-oriented and multicultural with a stable and sustainable economy. Yet, in spite of this weakness, Keyman and Öniş assert that Turkey has become an important actor in the post-9/11 world.

Inserting Turkey-European Union relations into their framework, the authors

claim that the developments which resulted in the opening of full accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005 cannot be explained without taking into consideration the increasing importance of Turkey after the September 11 attacks. In this period, as part of its efforts to restructure the Middle East, the US approached Turkey with the aim of presenting it as a model country in the region. With regard to Turkey-European Union relations, the authors also pay attention to the indirect significance of the division that the 2003 Iraqi war triggered among the European Union's countries. They argue that the future of Turkey-EU relations will depend not only on Turkey's economic stability and democratization, but also on the European Union's decision concerning its role and agency in the post-9/11 world. In this context, the authors point out the potential for reciprocal contribution in bilateral relations: while the European Union can help Turkey consolidate its democracy and become a multicultural society, Turkey can contribute to the European Union's efforts to transform itself into a global actor.

The book draws attention to the AK Party's emergence as an agent voicing societal demands based on social justice and economic growth in a period in which economic problems such as inequality and social injustice were on the rise due to the exposure of Turkey's economy to the global market since the 1980s, and the political system was largely characterized by corruption, clientelism and democratic deficiencies. According to Keyman and Öniş, the AK Party's communitarian-liberal synthesis successfully reconciled "the free market with community values, religious beliefs, societal norms, and local traditions." Within this framework, they consider the AK Party's emphasis on urgent economic problems, social justice, and particularly democracy as a fundamental basis for long-term solutions to Turkey's major problems, as the secrets to its success. As Keyman and Öniş note, these points also constitute the AK Party's keys to convincing the public that it is a more center-right party than an Islamist one.

As far as the failure of the CHP is concerned, in contrast to the success of the AK Party, the authors indicate that the CHP has made many mistakes. First, it appears oblivious to the economic problems Turkey faces. Second, it remains very dependant on the tradition of Turkish statism. And finally, its behavior toward small and medium-sized enterprises can only be described as lukewarm, and it continually overlooks their demands. Keyman and Öniş also underline the fact that the CHP, ignoring local demands, remains uninterested *vis-à-vis* the issues of democratic reform and European Union membership.

Keyman and Öniş announce that Turkey should decide either to transform its state-society relations into a democratic form, or to surrender itself to Turkish nationalism. This assessment, which is still valid today, focuses on the fact that there is "a strong societal will and demand for making Turkey an economically stable, democratically governed and culturally pluralist society." They argue that this "will and demand" emerged as a reaction against the existing political and economical system for the first time in the 1999 national election, which left many parties outside of parliament. This strong reaction became

more concrete via the 2002 election which established the saliency of the AK Party as an important domestic agent.

Emphasizing the burgeoning globalization process and the decline of national sovereignty in the post-9/11 period, Keyman and Öniş provide a basis for the rational assessment of actual political developments, such as the "Kurdish move" and the "Armenia move." Notably, there are some attempts today to consider these kinds of democratic movements as an imposition of the US or other foreign actors. Analyzing Turkey's political process in the intersection of global and local dynamics can prevent us from such simplifications.

It is also notable that Keyman and Öniş draw attention to the existence of a dilemma confronting the AK Party: "either, it will choose to alienate its core Islamist supporters by choosing to relegate their claims for cultural recognition into the background,

or it will face the charge from key segments of the Turkish state and society that it is ultimately an identity-based party and its claim to being a political movement of the center is not a genuine claim." This consideration can be important for some part of the society, particularly Kemalists / authoritarian elite, with regard to their attitude towards the AK Party. Nevertheless, I think that the party, from the 2002 to today, is faced with a more important dilemma: either, it will adopt and advocate for *all* claims for cultural recognition and therefore demonstrate that it is an agent aiming at the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, or it will obey the status quo which is state-centric, authoritarian, and nationalistic. It is crucial to define the AK Party's dilemma in such a manner in order to correctly put Turkey's actual change and transformation process into words.

Jülide Karakoç, *Ankara University*

Muslim Modernities: Expressions of the Civil Imagination

It is a truism of contemporary social thought that modernity is not singular in its trajectories, but multiple. One especially significant element in the "multiple modernities" perspective concerns religion. Whereas two generations ago, most scholars assumed that modernization brought about the gradual privatization and decline of religion, it is now recognized that religion's development in modern societies can be highly varied. Western Europe may be a

deeply secular place, but the United States is not. The revitalization of religion seen in Muslim, Hindu, and southern Christian lands, then, represents not an "anti-modern" reaction, but one more illustration of the multiple pathways to the modern.

The contributors to this volume adopt a variant of this multiple modernities approach to the study of the refiguration of "social imaginaries" in the contemporary Muslim world. The editor, Amyn B. Sajoo,

is a well regarded scholar of Islamic intellectual history and social ethics. In the book's opening pages, Sajoo explains that in 2005 he was inspired by the work of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor to assemble a group of specialists of Islamic studies to reflect on the varied ways in which modern Muslims have created new "social imaginaries" to deal with the pluralist challenges of the modern era. Taylor's phrase, "social imaginary," refers to the common understandings embodied in narratives and discourse through which a people create and give legitimacy to moral notions that comprise the background to the civic and political order (p. 12). In addition to focusing on modern Muslim imaginaries, the ten chapters in the volume are united by a concern with comparing the way in which new varieties of Muslim imaginaries compare to the public ethical orders of the West. This "reflexive juxtaposition" of Western and Muslim social imaginaries makes this fine collection intellectually bracing.

The chapters range across academic disciplines, but most are located squarely in the philosophical and religious wing of the humanities, rather than comparative social science. In the first substantive chapter, Bruce Lawrence examines the diverse ways in which modern Muslim thinkers read the Qur'an. Comparing Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal's broad-spirited interpretation with that of Osama bin Laden, Lawrence concludes that bin Laden is not so much an Islamist or even a fundamentalist as a "descendant of Rasputin and the Russian anarchists of the early twentieth century" (49). In the next chapter, John Renard takes a literary approach to popular literature in Muslim societies and finds that

most blends "pre-Islamic local, regional or national" heroes with those of a trans-Islamic sort. In Chapter 4, Hasna Lebbady examines narratives of female-figures in Islamic Andalusia and traces their extraordinary influence in the Maghrib from the fifteenth to seventeenth century. In Chapter 5, Theodore Levin and Fairouz Nishanova provide a fascinating overview of the Agha Khan Foundatin Music Initiative in Central Asia. The effort aims "to facilitate the reimagination of traditional musical culture within a cosmopolitan and pluralistic Central Asian modernity" (95).

The book's last five chapters deepen the juxtaposition of Muslim and Western modernities, but in a way that reveals their interpenetration rather than opposition. In Chapter 6, Nilüfer Gole uses the headscarf controversy in France and Turkey as the point of entry to a discussion of the differing ways in each country implements a secular and progress-based vision of the civil order. She observes that it is "possible to speak of an excess of secularism, when it becomes a festish of modernity" (p. 130). Contrary to the position that Kevin McDonald sketches out in Chapter 9, she also argues that the headscarf controversy is related to a broader process whereby "the Muslim body becomes, for actors of Islamism, a site of resistance to secular modernity" (p. 134). In Chapter 7, Bryan Turner offers what is arguably the most "pessimistic" (p. 137) of the book's perspectives on contemporary Islamism (but not Islam). He notes that the "rituals of intimacy" associated with especially conservative varieties of Islamism may create an "enclave society" which is the very antithesis of the "overlapping associational supports" so

important for a properly functioning civil society (p. 157).

In Chapter 8, Eva Schubert develops a compelling model of citizenship and pluralist identity. Drawing on the recent scholarship of the economist Amartya Sen, she emphasizes that all human actors have multiple and overlapping identities, and ideals of citizenship that attempt to highlight one to the exclusion of all others, not least of those religious, "will merely reinforce social fragmentation and disable civic participation" (p. 182). In an especially versatile chapter, Kevin McDonald in Chapter 9 argues that, when speaking of contemporary global landscapes, it is imperative to break free of the opposition of global vs. local and East vs. West. He demonstrates that even the more radical of modern Islamists, like Sayyid Qutb, blend Islamic notions of politics and ethics with European political theory. Taking exception to many Western policy' commentaries on Islamic movements, McDonald emphasizes the need to recognize the "religious dimension at the centre of practices not based on a claim to autonomy" (p. 205).

In a thoughtful conclusion to the volume, Sajoo calls for a "middle ground" (p. 211) analysis of contemporary Muslim social imaginaries, one that steers clear of the simple polarity of "rule-centric" fundamentalism and relativistic cosmopolitanism. "To perceive ethics in Islamic contexts as no more than a shari`a centric code," he writes, "is to privilege the narrowest of interpretations." More important, such an approach fails to do justice to the contemporary variety of Muslim ethical praxis. Growing numbers of believers look to "the institutions of civil society as a central tenet of democratic culture" (p. 224). Efforts to scale up such a pluralist Muslim ethics have certainly not been helped by the "clash-of-civilization" claims of some Western commentators. But these hybridic social imaginaries, drawing on modern democratic as well as Muslim ethics, are alive and growing. Their efflorescence is the result, not of any "Western" derivation, but of the fact that they respond to yearning of many Muslim moderns for a modern, civic, and pluralist profession of the faith.

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The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East

By *Olivier Roy*
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008,160 pp., ISBN 9780231700337.

Political developments in the Middle East have recently received a great deal of attention by journalists, editors, and academics, in addition to government policy makers. It seems that everyone has become a stakeholder in the future of this region, where crises have unexpectedly worsened

with the invasion of Iraq. Crises in the Middle East are commonly explained by the supposed 'geo-strategy' of Islam, along with theories about the clash of civilizations, which mainly assert that the Muslim world wages war on the West by using terrorism. For many, conflicts ranging from Palestine,

to riots in the Paris suburbs, to Bin Laden, show the dramatic influence of the geo-strategy of Islam. On the other hand, some researchers prefer to deepen their questioning and investigate the broader structural causes behind the conflicts. While the former approach suffers from reductionism, the latter requires an intellectual enterprise which takes into account historical, sociological, and political factors. It pays attention to the Middle Eastern context as well as the influence of larger international developments. Examining Middle East politics and Islam by focusing on different dimensions from his earlier studies, Olivier Roy takes a stand in favor of the second approach. His recently published book, *The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East*, advances his arguments presented in *Failure of Political Islam* (1994), *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (2004), and *Secularism Confronts Islam* (2007).

The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East seeks to discuss Middle Eastern conflicts in their own context as well as in reference to Western society's internal debates, including the problem of immigration and Islam in the West. Olivier Roy argues that there is no "geo-strategy of Islam," a position which is opposed to the idea of Islam itself as a fundamental cause of conflict. Thus, rather than pointing to Islam as a root of contemporary chaos, Roy emphasizes historical developments: for example, the collapse of the project to create an Arab Kingdom in 1918, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the destruction of the balance between Shi'ism and Sunnism. In light of these fundamental developments, nationalism, i.e. pan-Arabism, and Islamism survived and maintained their power, while other ideologies and political projects failed in the course of time.

Four chapters of the book are framed around two discussions: the failure of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq that has worsened the present chaos, and the emergence of Iran as a significant actor, an actor which has benefited largely from the U.S.'s failure. Roy states that the U.S. invasion and the subsequent developments in Iraq have led to a demolition of the strategic balance in the Middle East, the previous balance between Sunni and Shia, which could not be ameliorated by external major powers. The book provides evidence supporting the idea that neither the desire to control oil nor the impulse to act on behalf of Israel's wishes significantly influenced the U.S. decision to intervene in the region. Rather, the invasion was driven by the ideological concerns of a neoconservative team within the Bush administration's tenure, whose aim was the Greater Middle East Reform Project. Building on the basic premises of development theory, Roy notes, this project aimed at top-down democratization and social engineering through enhancing externally funded civil society organizations. However, the project underestimated the issue of political legitimacy and anthropological realities of societies. The role of nationalism and political Islam, called Islamo-nationalism, which were rooted in the country's history, tradition, and its social fabric, were rarely acknowledged, although they might be valuable instruments and interlocutors for any democratization policy, superseding community loyalties and overcoming the tribal and clan segmentation of the region.

After pointing to the significance of Islamo-nationalism, Roy moves on to identify

actors who did and do take the power of Islamo-nationalism into account, such as the Islamists themselves. Building on his arguments in *Failure of Political Islam*, Roy asserts that the conceptual framework the Islamists developed in the 1970s and 1980s remained inadequate to create an Islamic state. Thus, some Islamist movements opted for political integration, as in the Turkish model with respect to the AK Party. Adopting a Muslim version of Christian democracy, they began to consider that the problem of instability was more likely related to good governance and the need to fight against corruption. They suggested tools that may more effective in addressing these issues than the secularist ones. Meanwhile, the more radical, neo-fundamentalist Islamist movements showed no interest in creating either state or nation, but are more concerned with the strict application of *sharia* in order to create *ummah*, such as in the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Sunni Wahhabism.

Among these neo-fundamentalist movements, Roy explains the characteristics of Al-Qaeda as well as its role in the evolution of the conflict in the final chapter by referring to his previous book, *Globalized Islam*. He gives less credit to Al-Qaeda than many other political analysts do because he considers other loyalties, including local, national, tribal or sectarian to be more important, and argues that they endure longer than the ideological or organizational loyalties that Al-Qaeda embodies. The entire chapter is devoted to Al-Qaeda in order to convince the reader that the prevailing overemphasis on Al-Qaeda obscures the more pressing realities of the region. According to Roy, given the existence of negative examples, in contrast to rooting out Al-Qaeda it would be

better to incorporate moderate Islamists in the political system in order to bring about a democratization of the Muslim world as well as to halt crises. Similar to the line of thinking he presented in *Globalized Islam* (2004), Roy's argument is that the suppression of Islamists by the Muslim world's secular authoritarian states, which are supported by the West, would cause severe consequences. Secularists have no option but to accept the moderate Islamists' presence. It is noteworthy that the tension between secularists and Islamists is overlooked to a great extent and is not viewed as one of the possible fault lines in Roy's study.

Interestingly, the other actor taking the power of Islamo-nationalism into account is Iran. Roy spends a great deal of time discussing the conflict between the Shias and Sunnis and the position of Iran in the region. However, the root issue of the Shia-Sunni division is merely summarized, leaving many parts untouched. Thus, a reader who is less familiar with the region may experience a difficult time understanding the point. Although Roy uses analogies, for example, comparing the Shia/Sunni and Protestants/Catholics in the Northern Ireland, they do not serve to fill this gap. On the other hand, Roy precisely maintains the importance of the Iranian factor in the evolution of the crises. Iran is the only country that has simultaneously valued the power of Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism since the 1980s. Iran has also attempted to defuse the Shia-Sunni tension, showing strong opposition to Israel, in order that the country might be seen as the leader of both the Arab cause and pan-Islamism. The American military interventions after 9/11 eased the way for Iran by eliminating its two enemies:

Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Roy presents a number of propositions regarding Iran's future policies: Iran will continue its nuclear program, will avoid an open military confrontation, and will seek further rapprochement with Sunni radicals.

By asserting Iran's central role, Roy raises the real and immediate problem that Europe and the U.S. have found on the table: should their focus be on the regime or on Iran's nuclear program? Roy begins his analysis of this issue by exploring the Ahmedinejad phenomenon. This remains an important component in assessing Iran's political game, since Ahmedinejad chose confrontation rather than cooperation over issues of its nuclear program and with respect to Israel. As Roy notes, Ahmedinejad's power grew out of the conservative networks that were enhanced by the Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and anti-imperialist ideology. Roy goes on to speculate about a scenario wherein America would bomb Iran. The point of this scenario is to show how Iran would be able to activate the refusal front. Given this risky possibility, the best solution would be to weaken the refusal front by including Hezbollah in regional negotiations, opening a dialogue with Hamas, and starting negotiations with Iran. All these attempts would be worthwhile if the global war on terror were ended as soon as possible. However, the Israel-Palestine problem is examined in the context of Iran's refusal front. It seems that the problem is not viewed as a fault line.

Several fundamental questions relevant to Middle East politics are raised by Roy's book. For example: is Islam compatible with Western values? Is the real goal of the Islamists to launch *sharia*? What is the geo-strategic impact of the establishment of Islam in Europe? Why did the U.S. fail in the war against terror? The goal is to identify the desirable and undesirable actors, which would support Roy's argument that there is no geostrategy of Islam. Ultimately, *Chaos in the Middle East* seems to be more of a policy proposal drawing on the findings of Roy's previous studies. He points out the fault lines of present projects and proposes some alternative policies. Taking Islamo-nationalism into account, discarding Iran without bombing, supporting Islamism, and focusing on al-Qaeda's networks all comprise the blueprint of his project.

Although Roy deals with many political problems in the Middle East, the book has some weaknesses that were not observed in his previous studies. Like many scholars, Roy engages in clarifying Islamic conceptual issues, including *sharia*, and the division between Sunni and Shia theology. However, his conceptual clarification suffers from some simplification and from an underestimation of the many nuances and variations. A similar problem appears in his categorization of neo-Islamists and neo-fundamentalists. Like many other scholars, he ends up by presenting a desirable type of Muslim – in other words, good guys – and undesirable others, bad guys. The last two chapters of the book detail a policy package developed to respond to the Iranian nuclear question and to Al-Qaeda. Rather than existing as a formal academic study, the book more closely resembles policy briefings or think tank policy reports, usually presented in Washington D.C. It is hard to determine in this presentation whether this was the aim of author or the result of the translation.

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Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East

By *Ussama Makdisi*
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, 262 pp., ISBN 9780801446214.

In this remarkable book, Ussama Makdisi offers a marvelously subtle analysis of American missionary work in nineteenth-century Syria, and just as importantly, the Syrian Maronite reaction to the missionaries' overtures. Although much of the work on American missions has focused primarily on the missionaries, Makdisi meticulously reconstructs the cultural collision that transpired in Syria, and shows how the collision perplexed and transformed the religious assumptions of both sides. This book is now the field's best micro-history of the early Protestant missionary encounter.

Makdisi begins by elaborating the starkly different religious worlds of New England's Puritan settlers and Mount Lebanon's Maronite community, as seen primarily through the roughly contemporary writings of Cotton Mather of Boston, Massachusetts, and Istifan Duwayhi, patriarch of the Maronite Church in the late seventeenth century. Mather's Puritanism was millennialist, expecting that religious adversaries and the "heathen" would be destroyed and/or converted by the inexorable march of the Christian gospel. The hope for conversion went substantially unfulfilled with the New England Puritans' most obvious missionary target, their Native American neighbors. The Maronites, by contrast, emphasized survival under Ottoman rule and fidelity to Rome, to which their church had submitted in the twelfth century. Maintaining orthodoxy was the key to their re-

ligious agenda, not seeking conversion of others or trying to end coexistence.

To Makdisi, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), the chief American missionary society of the nineteenth century, was "indelibly stamped by the template of the Puritan experience with the Indians" (52). Makdisi may overstate the actual connections between Puritan missions to Native Americans and the ABCFM's global efforts, as it is not clear to what extent the ABCFM missionaries consciously felt they were completing the unfinished business of Puritan evangelism of Indians. Nevertheless, Anglo-American Puritanism certainly had a genealogical connection to the ABCFM missionaries, as did the "disinterested benevolence" of the New Divinity theologians of the late eighteenth century. Christian benevolence required that the missionaries take the gospel to the heathen and to unconverted, nominal Christians wherever they could be found. Doing so would fulfill essential prerequisites to the coming of the millennium prophesied in the Bible.

When the handful of ABCFM missionaries arrived in the Middle East in the early 1820s, their optimism about the gospel and Bible made them deeply insensitive to the religious culture which they entered. As they visited various churches and monasteries, they badgered priests and monks about the deficiencies of Catholic or East-

ern Orthodox theology. The missionaries' failed to grasp the differences of their new cultural location. Theirs was "a mission born of a particular moment in American history as it collided with the realities of an entirely different moment in Ottoman Arab history" (88). They were used to being cultural imperialists, but in the well-established multi-religious milieu of the Ottoman Empire, they had no means of imposing their religious agenda. All they could do was make rude, poorly received arguments. The patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh became so concerned about the missionaries' threat to Maronite orthodoxy that he condemned them in 1823. The missionaries, in his view, were wolves in sheep's clothing, seeking to disrupt the Maronites' long-lasting theological purity.

Not all Maronites agreed with Hubaysh. As'ad Shidyaq, a Maronite language teacher who came to work for the missionaries, embraced their faith in 1825. Despite the warnings of the patriarch, As'ad began to proselytize for the Americans' conversionist beliefs. In a deeply sympathetic chapter on the convert, Makdisi portrays As'ad as "the first to try and reconcile hitherto irreconcilable constructions of faith" (111). His efforts incurred the wrath of the Maronite leaders, even as the missionaries abandoned him to his fate. Patriarch Hubaysh offered increasingly urgent appeals for As'ad to return to the Catholic faith, but As'ad refused to concede that he had left the fold. He only meant to bring the Maronites back to their original faith, the apostolic tradition displayed in the New Testament. As'ad's public criticism of the Maronite hierarchy was unfathomable and intolerable, given the Maronites' priority of maintaining ortho-

doxy in the plural Ottoman environment. The patriarch began to paint As'ad as insane, and had him detained at a Maronite monastery. Repeated escape attempts led to his torture and incessant pressure to repent. Violence associated with the Greek revolt against the Ottomans led the American missionaries to leave Lebanon in 1828, and As'ad soon died in prison. Makdisi sees the vicious suppression and abandonment of As'ad as tragic fallout from the collision of these two cultural systems.

Over time, American missionaries used As'ad's death as a justification for a more civilizational mission in Syria. Increasingly, the chief problem the missionaries tried to address was not so much their evangelistic targets' lack of saving faith, but their degraded culture. The turning point in Americans' attitude came with the Druzes' massacres of Maronites in Syria in 1860. From this point forward, the American missionaries claimed more sympathy for the eastern Christians, whom they saw as assaulted by bloodthirsty Muslims. Because of the increasing western imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire after 1860, the missionaries could also focus on transformation of Arab culture by the building of hospitals and schools, most notably the Syrian Protestant College. Although Americans had plenty of reason to criticize their own nation's history of race relations, the missionaries came to see American Christian culture as the solution to the violence of the primitive Ottoman world.

Makdisi concludes on a more hopeful note by examining the ecumenical temperament of Butrus al-Bustani, whose conversion under the missionaries came through similar circumstances to As'ad Shidyaq's.

But Bustani converted in the 1840s after the missionaries had put considerable pressure on authorities to allow them and their converts to operate freely, and the Ottomans had recognized Protestants as a protected group. In Bustani, Makdisi sees a truly new creature of the clash between American and Ottoman culture, as Bustani came to advocate tolerant education for the varied religious groups represented in Syria, and coexistence of these people as equal subjects in non-sectarian political community.

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U.S. Foreign Policy and Islamist Politics

By *Ahmad S. Moussalli*
Florida: University Press of Florida, 2008, 225 pp., ISBN 9780813031491.

"I argue that the vast majority of Islamist movements do not pose a real threat to the West and its interests," Ahmad S. Moussalli asserts in his latest book, U.S. *Foreign Policy and Islamist Politics*. Taking this idea as his starting point, the author confronts one of the key questions for the future of the Middle East region: whether to include – or exclude – Islamist parties as protagonists and interlocutors in regional and international policy. This question has been raised in American and western debates in general since the 1990s. But the pressing need to give a coherent response to this dilemma has become more urgent in the last few years. The experiences of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have revealed the need for resolution, as well as the contradictions that result from any endeavour to find solutions to the conflicts and crises affecting this important part of the world. Therein lies the broad interest of this book, which seeks to demonstrate that the construction of Islamism as a threat to the West has been created above all "by the media, academia, policy makers, and strategists, as well as Muslim regimes and Israel." Further,

Moussalli argues that this media construction deliberately leaves aside any real, on-the-ground analysis of the many different Islamist parties, whose evolution and trajectories tend to show their diversity, their social integration and their progressive adaptation to democratic dynamics.

Moussalli rightly notes that the problem with the image of Islam as a source of fear and threat is that it has long been established and reiterated as the west's dominant perception of Islamism, whereas it is in fact a narrow view, based on choices made by the media to depict supporters of the most fundamentalist discourse, or the most radical and extremist sectors. Put another way, extremist views get media attention. The overwhelming application of this criterion for choosing Islamic actors to portray in the media conceals or silences the fact that most Islamist parties are situated in the enormous central area usually hidden between fundamentalists and the people of violence.

Moussalli, sharing conclusions long held by a minority of fellow academics, gives prominence to the trajectory and evolution

of reformist Islamist parties – a path that is very different from the fundamentalist and extremist offshoots. Reformist Islamism, Moussalli argues, represents the emergence of a new political generation that is also part of the experience of modernisation; it is therefore linked to the many social and political changes being experienced by Muslim societies today. In fact, observation of the kinds of behavior prompted by Islamic assertiveness in the political arena shows three interdependent features that social sciences consider to be modern: the progressive autonomy of the individual, the individualisation of social actors, and the increased participation of women in public life. Consequently, reformist Islamists move away from ahistoricist views in which Islam is perceived as a timeless system that reinforces societal immobility. On the contrary, they tend to be very concerned with socioeducative matters and with the search for references of their own to retrieve a positive and affirmative image of themselves. They expect the West to treat them with recognition, but they are not constructing the recovery of Islam against the West.

In chapter 3 of his book, "The Context and Ideologies of Islamist Politics," Moussalli draws attention to a very significant factor of analysis: Islamist diversity and the importance of analyzing each case within its national context. He concludes: "the moderate Islamists constitute the majority of the Islamist movements," while he shows how "these movements have been created largely as responses to internal socioeconomic and political conditions." That is, they have a local and autochthonous *raison d'être*. Any co-arising critique of the U.S., he says, is a consequence not of deeply-embedded anti western views, but rather of American policy in favor of Israel and its support for regional authoritarian regimes, not forgetting the impact of the invasion of Iraq, which has produced a wide anti-American social feeling, not only on the part of Islamism.

Consequently, Moussalli proposes that we "rethink U.S. strategic interests and come up with new policies." In the light of the recent election of Barak Obama, who has expressed a desire to introduce new parameters into American policy towards the Middle East, some of the author's proposals deserve to be emphasized. In general terms, Moussalli advises that the U.S. ought "to stop postulating a cultural or religious threat or a global Islamic enemy, and instead to try to locate and solve problems within their immediate contexts." To recover the U.S's image, Washington ought to "reduce the [use of] arbitrary and brutal force and uphold the rule of law" (which it seems Obama has already initiated within the framework of the "war against terror") and "to predicate political participation of both Islamists and secularists on renouncing the use of violence."

The author gives particular importance to the role of Iran and Turkey in the new Middle-Eastern context. With regard to Iran, he argues, the United States needs to shift from reactive to proactive. Iran must be a key component in the future stability of the Middle East and the Gulf region. Moussalli therefore proposes a new regional order that integrates Iran. With that aim, he suggests using the strategic move of favoring Iran's entry into the World Trade Organization, which to date has been obstructed by the United States.

Turkey "should also be included in a new regional order and should not be used only to counter the influence of Iran and Syria. Alliances such as those between Turkey and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran and Syria, on the other, increase security risks for U.S. interests and the parties concerned." Although Moussalli leaves this point implicit, it is certain that Turkey is showing great potential to be among what we could call the "new mediators," capable of fulfilling a key role as interlocutor with all participants to resolve Middle Eastern conflicts. Turkey is an indispensable mediator between Israel and Syria, respected by Iran and, as the Gaza crisis has shown, an irreplaceable mediator between Hamas and the international community, as well as an interlocutor between Arabs and Palestinians. We should not forget that Turkey was the only country present at both the summits in Qatar and Kuwait. All in all, this book is a welcome addition to the literature on foreign policy and religion in the context of U.S. - Middle Eastern relations.

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American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region

By *W. Taylor Fain*
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 283 pp., ISBN 9780230601512.

This book examines the shifting balance of power between two western allies in the tumultuous Middle East. British interest in the Persian Gulf increased significantly during the nineteenth century, since the region functioned geographically as a liaison between the Mediterranean and the Indian subcontinent. Britain's political domination of the region began in the 1820s, culminating in the Treaty of Maritime Peace of 1853, which created the system of trucial states along the Arabian coast. The treaty secured the political and economic stability of the region, which was vital for the maintenance of Britain's Indian trade routes. British influence in the Gulf continued uninterrupted up until the period immediately following WWII. The post-war period not only brought about the demise of the old modes of imperialism but also gave way to the rise of new international political actors like the United States and the Soviet Union. The US entered the region as a powerful actor after the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, and later extended its domination over other regions in the Middle East. W. Taylor Fain's study focuses on "the Persian Gulf region" and analyzes diplomatic relations between the US and Britain from the 1950s to the 1970s. For Fain, this period of power politics witnessed how the interests of the two Western powers overlapped, and especially how they conflicted. Put more elegantly, "this book underscores the fragility of the vaunted Anglo-American 'special relationship' during the Cold War" (11).

The first chapter of Fain's study is dedicated to an analysis of how the Gulf region came to be an important centerpiece in British foreign policy, a status that began with the foundation of trading factories in Basra in Ottoman Iraq. In the following decades, Britain extended its control over the rest of the region. In addition to providing background on the importance of the region for the British, this chapter illustrates how the British insistence on maintaining the old modes of imperialism collided with the priority in American foreign policy of containing Soviet communism, which surfaced prominently during the nationalization of oil in Iran. The chapter ends with the oil crisis in Iran during the 1950s. The second chapter, which covers the period from 1950 to 1956, skillfully shows how mistrust arose between British and American policymakers. "British officials," Fain argues, "viewed the Americans as political interlopers" (74). The Suez Crisis of 1956, when the Americans opposed an Anglo-French attack on Egypt, was the peak point of these policy conflicts. The third chapter, which focuses on the period between 1957 and 1960, successfully shows that the attempts of the Eisenhower and Macmillan administrations to re-ground their special relationship on more friendly terms proved useful, while at the same time, the regional priorities of each nation, Saudi Arabia in the American case and the small Gulf states in the British, created further tensions between the two transatlantic allies. The Revolution of 1958 in Iraq in particular deepened the divide; the US decided to support the overarching nationalism of Nasser while the British encouraged Qasim against Nasser.

The fourth chapter, which focuses on a relatively short period from 1961 to 1963,

illustrates how the previous dynamics of foreign relations between the US and Britain continued unchanged. Even though the similarities between national policies towards the region were emphasized at every public occasion, the way each country wanted to handle the threat of Arab nationalism differed markedly, and Washington feared the heavy-handed military options that London might bring to bear in times of crisis. The fifth chapter analyzes the period from 1964 to 1968 in which Britain experienced further domestic economic troubles. The Sterling Crisis of November 1967 devalued the pound and the British balance of payments deteriorated. Such economic difficulties, coupled with changing British strategies for oil in the region, heralded the British departure in 1971, leaving America the field. The last chapter of Fain's study deals with the British decision to leave, how it shocked politicians in Washington, and the attempts made by the Americans to fill the void left by the British departure. The US chose Saudi Arabia and Iran as "two pillars" of Western support in the region, a decision that would create more troubles in the coming decades. Fain concludes that British and American policy towards the region had many various layers of differing importance, which overlapped and conflicted from time to time. For Fain, the relationship between the two "is marked by tension and littered with important failures more often than it is characterized by lasting successes" (208).

Fain's study is a solid piece of scholarship, which deals with a topic that is, in his own words, 'a well-trodden territory.' In contrast to the works of Wm. Roger Louis, Nathan J. Citino, Aaron David Miller, and others, the scope of Fain's study is much

broader, yet less nuanced, which makes his work vulnerable as some of historical complexity of the Middle East is lost in his account. Although Fain's argument that the special relationship between the US and Britain faced tough times in the Middle East is not terribly new, his conclusions on the topic further strengthen the normative perception of diplomatic history between the transatlantic allies. Moreover, Fain's use of every available secondary source and his command of the various archival sources is simply mind boggling. His study is very accessible, written in a clear academic fashion, and chronologically structured, which makes it a good choice for classroom use, particularly as it provides a broad perspective on the diplomatic relationship between the US and Britain in the Middle East. For specialists, on the other hand, the book tends to get little bit repetitive, especially in chapter four.

While there is much to praise in Fain's study, I found his use of the term "Persian Gulf region" inopportune. In the opening pages, he makes clear that the term for him means a region ranging from Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula and from the Gulf States to the East Indian Ocean. He claims that all of these regions are interconnected in American and British foreign policy-making. While I understand his insistence on limiting his focus to the Gulf region – otherwise such a project would simply have been undoable – I cannot help but wonder whether the policy choices of the US and the British go beyond these artificial boundaries. Particularly, the instances in the first half of the book when Fain discusses the oil crisis in Iran in 1951, the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, it is clear that "the Persian Gulf region" as a political and geographic designator is used too loosely to include these important watersheds in Middle Eastern history. In the second half of the study, this seems to be a less of a problem, to be fair.

Overall, I found Fain's study of utmost importance to the field. It contributes to our understanding of the history of the region and the diplomatic relationship between the US and Britain and it convincingly portrays how the nature of this special relationship came to evolve over the middle decades of the twentieth century. Students and scholars interested in these topics will greatly benefit from his insights.

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Under Crescent & Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages

By *Mark R. Cohen*
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994, 296 pp., ISBN 9780691139319.

"Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages" by Mark Cohen is a useful work for those interested in the question of the status of Jews under Christian rule and Muslim rule in the Middle Ages. This book boldly attempts to analyze the history of Jewish-Christian and Jewish-Muslim relations and compare their similarities and differences over a period of nearly one thousand years.

In his introduction, Mark Cohen explains the motivation behind the book by summarizing the historiography of Jews living under Muslim as well as Christian rule. He identifies two main perspectives on the Jewish experiences in the East and the West, both of which are responses to contemporary Jewish experiences in Christian Europe and the Middle East. The continued exclusion and persecution of European Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries, despite the European Enlightenment's promises of tolerance and acceptance, led to the creation of a "lachrymose" conception of Jewish history in Christendom.

The author's starting point is the status of Jews under Muslim rule and the conflicting perspectives on this issue, "the myth of the Islamic-Jewish interfaith utopia" and "the counter-myth of Islamic persecution of Jews." The utopian myth of tolerance contributed to Jewish Orientalists and historians' denouncement of the medieval Christian treatment of Jews and criticism of liberal Christian Europe. The same myth helped Arabs argue that Zionism shattered a utopia of Arab-Jewish harmony under Muslim rule. The counter-myth of Muslim persecution is sometimes claimed by some Jewish thinkers. This new myth has been described by Mark Cohen as "the neo-lachrymose conception of Jewish-Arab history." (p.9) Cohen argues that both the creation of a lachrymose conception of Jewish history in Christendom and the neo-lachrymose conception of Jewish-Arab history "equally distort the past." (xxi) So, he proposes "a comparative approach" to understand why "the Islamic-Jewish relationship bred so much less violence and persecution than relations between Christians and Jews. (xxi)

By using the imagery of the "crescent and cross," Mark Cohen outlines his comparative framework for investigating the situation of Jews living within the Muslim and Christian civilizations. Cohen's approach operates by applying two models to the Jews; one of inclusion and the other of exclusion. The author studies the different aspects of the living conditions of Jews under either Islamic or Christian rule to explain which model applies to the case at hand. He analyzes the theological assumptions, juridical, economic, social, and political circumstances as well as the irrational convictions about the "Jewish Question." He substantiates his claims by finding written evidence to support the distinction between the two civilizations. This evidence supports his thesis that the Islamic world had a more 'civilized' and inclusive (in Cohen's terms 'pluralistic') approach to the 'other' guaranteed by "Shari'a," while the Christian world and the Church excluded Jews from legal protection.

By contrasting Islam *versus* Christianity in their more or less divinely ordained approach to the 'other,' Cohen demonstrates mechanisms operating within "dar al-islam" as well as Christendom of Northern Europe. Although the aim of Cohen's comparative method was to demythologize the narrative of a utopian state of tolerance that the non-Muslims enjoyed under the Islamic rule as well as its counter-myth of the persecuted unbelievers living in Muslim lands, the author seems to focus more on the analysis of the Jewish status as an "outcast" in the land of the Cross.

Since the beginning of Islam, Jews were viewed as being immersed within a divinely ordained social, economic, political, and religious system. The Muslim idea was to

include non-Muslims in the name of peace. For Islam, the price the Jews had to pay for protection was their subordination to Muslim law and accepting the lowest social status within the framework of a peaceful Islamic order. However, within Christendom, the Jews were positioned outside the protective boundaries of religious and secular law. The main argument of the less "civilized" approach applied to the Jews within the domain of Christendom was based on the lack of clearly stated and divinely ordained rules toward the Jews. Thus, positioning them outside of the protection of regular law exposed them to the arbitrary decisions of unpredictable rulers. To make the contrast sharper, the Islamic "peaceful strategy" has been compared to the Ashkenazi status, as they were considered 'outsiders' along with 'pagans, unbelievers, heretics, and lepers.'

According to the author, Islam solved the "Jewish problem" in a more "civilized" way, as the Jews were discriminated against by Muslims only if they violated the divinely sanctioned social order. As Cohen writes, "Unlike Christendom, which solved its Jewish problem in the later Middle Ages by anti Semitic excesses of murder, forced conversion, or expulsion, none of these violent 'solutions' to the 'Jewish problem' were employed in the Islamic world. Islam continued to accept the Jews as an embedded and organic element of society even as the general climate of well-being and security of the earlier period waned." (p.282) Such a state of idyllic affairs lingered until the rise of Zionism, and Arab/Muslim objection to the establishment of the State of Israel. According to Cohen, the Muslim "solution" applied to the Jewish populations in Muslim lands contributed to the utopian myth

of a peaceful land where the Jews found protection, while the exclusion paradigm applied within the framework of Christendom contributed to the Jewish stereotype. The fact that the Jews in Europe were protected by neither religious nor secular law was taken as evidence to contrast with the Muslim peaceful and just order. The image of the Jew-as-an-alien or the Jew-as-a-leper originated from the domain of Christendom. Cohen underlines that in Christendom, the Jews found themselves trapped between the direct control of a secular ruler and religious superstition imposed on them by Church officials. In Europe, Jews were excluded not only from the body of the Church but also from society, culture, and economy living in segregated quarters.

In Muslim countries, the physical appearance of Jewish people and their cultural assimilation allowed them to live out their daily lives in less restricted surroundings. There was no prohibition for public bathing (except for Fridays), intermarriages, or local and international commerce. In the Muslim world, public life was carried out in two main spaces, the mosque and the market, the latter space was open to Jews. Unlike in Christendom, there was opportunity for theological debates. According to the author, non-formal relations between the communities in daily life were due to the informal nature of the Islamic social order.

The main conclusion of the discussion on the "peaceful coexistence under the Muslim protection" myth was that the Muslim paradigm was more "civilized." According to the author, such a myth lingered until the rise of Zionism, the excess and fanaticism of fascism, and the Arab/Muslim objection to the establishment of the State of Israel.

By explaining that the origins of the myth of Muslim non-violence against Jews was based on the ideal of inclusion of the Jews within a diverse divine community, although remaining in a subordinated position in the Islamic world, Cohen contributes to a clearer understanding of why in Christendom, Jewish people were socially excluded, theologically stigmatized, and physically expelled or restricted to certain residential quarters.

However, both in the Islamic and the Christian world, both domains asserted their superiority over the Jews living in their respective lands. Nevertheless, Islam recognized that other religions should be protected as long as they submitted to the Islamic ideal of peaceful coexistence. The Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish communities are two distinct groups of Jews because they lived in two distinct civilizations, but both were submissive actors. The Sephardic Jewish community resided under a Muslim world of 'tolerance' while the Ashkenazi Jewish community lived in a Christian world of 'intolerance.' As Mark Cohen writes, "Jews defined themselves vis-à-vis others just as others defined themselves vis-à-vis the Jews," yet the Jewish voice seems to be silent within both narratives narratives.

The determination of the rational of where the "other" fits into either the Islamic or Christian social order is decisive in this book's inquiry and, according to the author, reveals that the more inclusive Islamic world was also more 'civilized' in its treatment of the "other." In such terms, Cohen's analysis contributes to a better understanding of the contemporary interreligious impasse between the three main universal religious.

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Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir (Your History is Carefully Cleaned: Historian as an Autopsy Expert)

By *Cemil Koçak*
Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2009, 558 pp., ISBN 9789750506352.

The volume under review is the collection of many articles written at different times by Cemil Koçak. It consists of three main chapters, "Atatürk and the One-Party Regime," "İnönü and the One-Party Regime," and "As the One-Party Regime Changes." This thematic organization makes the edited volume easy to read. However, since the collection brings together different kinds of writings, such as polemics, conference papers, academic journal articles, and newspaper articles, the book has no the internal cohesion.

History lends itself available to those seeking to legitimize contemporary political/ideological positions. For Koçak, guessing what comes after that proposition is not impossible: it is of course the process of "clearing the past carefully" which is imposed by an "etatist/nationalist understanding" (9). History is hitched to the service of power when it is used to "adapt masses to

the current political/ideological air on the ground of cleared information" (11). This process operates on three stages (9-10). Firstly, some points/moments/events of history that are wanted to be forgotten are removed from the pages of history. Secondly, when the denial of happened things is not possible, some part (or the luminous face) of information about the happened thing is illustrated. Lastly, the thing which never happened is presented as if it had happened.

Koçak is optimistic that there exists a way of getting rid of such an approach. He points to "historiography", a job which can be done by digressing from the framework dressed in "straitjacket" (9). What Koçak understands from historiography is that one has to accept the information about the past as it is and should not care about its results. He compares historiography to forensic science. Like a medical examiner conducting an autopsy, a historian should exhibit his/her inferences in cold blood without concern for their effects and results (11). In his book, Koçak operates like an forensic expert and tries to illustrate carefully cleaned points/moments/events of the period from 1923 to 1950 in Turkey, which is called the "early Republic" (11).

Koçak gives many examples for each stage of the process of "clearing the past carefully". For instance, many of Atatürk's words have been totally removed from the books written to collect his speeches and declarations (31-32). In other cases, Atatürk's words have been partially quoted to legitimate some arguments (38-40). Information which is in original texts or written by some authors has been intentionally conveyed wrongly (18 and 44-45). Koçak supports his arguments with a very staggering example (47-50 and

57-58). The *Türk İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü* and the *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi* printed *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Atatürk's Speeches and Declarations) in 1981 and 1989 respectively. According to those texts, in his conversation with the US General Douglas MacArthur in 1932, Atatürk predicted that Germany would remember its ambitions and start another war, and depicted the Soviet Union as a threat for civilization and whole humanity. However, archival documents belie the two publishers. In contrast, during the interview, Atatürk predicted that a war would not be possible in the next ten years. Koçak refers to two reasons to explain this particular distortion: a concern to depict Atatürk as a fortune-teller or someone similar to a prophet, and an attempt to legitimize the anti-Communist stance of the Turkish state during the Cold War. Such examples bring to mind George Orwell's work in which history is rewritten to convince the people that new alliances and policies have always existed.

Koçak "tries to tear down dominant paradigms" (11) by putting all information which is presented as "reality" into test by comparing them to first-hand sources such as documents, memories and newspapers. His main concern is to free statements and events that "describe the interplay of relations within" them and outside them.[1] Although he believes in an "alternative paradigm" which is going to save the honor of historiography in Turkey, such an alternative paradigm is not completed yet. For Koçak, his writings (11) and other writings by scientific and objective historians will contribute to the formation of a new paradigm.

Koçak's concern for acting in a scientific and objective manner is so strong that

it leads him to argue that "a serious scientist [is the one that] analyzes the adventure of Turkish society as a subject of which he/she is not a part" (174). When we compare this argument to Michel Foucault's assertion of the 'impossibility to speak on our own archive', at first sight Koçak appears to be going too far. For Foucault, "it is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say".[2] In short, "archives remain unthought at the time they are operant".[3] The natural result of this argument is that "the description of the archive deploys its possibilities on the basis of the very discourses that have just ceased to ours."[4]

Then, are we going to sink into a deep silence about our own archive? Of course, not! For Foucault, when one is dealing with the time of which an author is not a part, one has only to describe it. When it comes to the time when the author is part of, however, "the problem is to free oneself from it." In other words, "when it is a matter of determining the system of discourse on which we are still living, when we have to question the words that are still echoing in our ears, which become confused with those we are trying to formulate, the archaeologist, like the Nietzschean philosopher, is forced to take a hammer on it."[5] The history of the present is just made possible by "presenting a critique of our time."[6]

Of course, Koçak is one of those who are very critical of the near past of Turkey. I think his concern to be scientific and objective must be understood as a critical stance on the near past. "Who is critical and a historian?" is the main question of Koçak and it travels over his all writings (425). In a country where there is a "literature of praise" which everyone takes for granted (174), Koçak undertakes to criticize and undermine this literature of praise by shedding light on hidden/forgotten/distorted things.

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Endnotes

1. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Trans.: A. M. Sheridan Smith, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 32.

2. Foucault, ibid, p. 146.

3. David Couzens Hoy, "Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?", Barry Smart (ed.), *Michel Foucault: Critical Assesments*, Vol. 1, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 281–301, p. 295.

4. Foucault, ibid, p. 147.

5. Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault, *The Will To Truth*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1981), p. 196.

6. T. Carlos Jacques, "Whence does the Critic Speak? A Study of Foucault's Geneology", Barry Smart (ed.), *Michel Foucault: Critical Assesments*, Vol. 3, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 97–112, p. 97.

Islam in Nederland en België

By *W.A.R. Shadid* and *P. S. van Koningsveld*
Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 282 pp., ISBN 9789042921009.

Shadid and van Koningsveld are at it again, this time with a full-length comparative treatment of Islam in two countries, the Netherlands and Belgium. For both authors

this is well-travelled territory. On numerous occasions during the past 30 years, they have collaborated on comprehensive studies involving Muslims living in the West, as well as occasionally on other religious and cultural minorities. Their expertise is particularly known as it concerns the institutionalization of Islam in Western European society, and several of their previous works have examined the topics covered in the present volume.

Belgium and the Netherlands share much in common: both are small, parliamentary states that play a central role in European Union politics. Both countries are host to similar immigrant populations, with strikingly parallel immigration histories (chiefly to fill vacancies in heavy manufacturing and mining during the 1960s and early 1970s); both have made a number of "accommodations" to their large Muslim populations (e.g., in terms of support for building mosques, training Muslim teachers, and making provisions for Islamic burial sites); and finally, following de-industrialization and several economic crises, both countries have struggled to address the escalating levels of unemployment, school and housing segregation and social exclusion by employing terms like "integration" to shore up the widening chasm between indigenous and non-indigenous groups.

Except for the fact that the northern half of Belgium is Dutch-speaking (ignoring for now the variety of dialects), thus linking it further with its northern neighbor, this is as far as the comparison goes. Belgium's internal government is vastly more complex, with regional (Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders) and communal (German, Dutch and French) differences, with each

level of government assigned to manage different affairs. Meanwhile, governance in the Netherlands is more centralized and its dominant religious influence (except for its southern most provinces) is Calvinist Protestantism in contrast to Belgium's Catholic hegemony. The Netherlands also hosts more than 40 Islamic primary schools, while Belgium has seen only one established in the past 20 years.

The book is divided into five sections with eight chapters. In the first two chapters Shadid and van Koningsveld discuss the position of Islam in both Belgium and the Netherlands, including the history of immigration, the demographic differences of settlement and ethnic concentration, as well as the official recognition of Islam by the respective governments. This section also contains important summaries of the different religious-political movements, Islamic schools of law, and summaries of various well-known Islamic sects such as the Ismailis, Alevis and the Twelvers.

Section two focuses on the place of mosques and imams, their legal support and status, as well as a discussion of the various Islamic organizations in both countries. In both chapters covered in this section, considerable emphasis is placed on the ethnically segregated mosques and Muslim organizations. The major ethnic groups include Indonesian, Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan. The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium are striking here, with the Dutch model consisting of various national councils, while in neighboring Belgium there has been an officially recognized head of the Muslim community since 1998 (not unlike that for the Jewish, Eastern Orthodox or Protestant communities).

Some of that controversial history, involving the selection and screening of eligible candidates, is also provided.

Chapters five and six consist mainly of the rudiments of Islamic belief and behavior, including summaries of the five pillars, debates over clothing and *halal* food, and feast days. Nestled in between these elements are several pages discussing the increased attention that has been given to political Islam in the past decade. Several reports have emerged which suggest that Islamic radicalism is on the rise, and that young men are particularly susceptible to recruitment by Islamist organization owing to their pervasive experience with cultural alienation and labor market discrimination: this lack of belonging, of not feeling sufficiently a part of one's society is widespread in Europe among its (primarily male) Muslim youth. While radicalism represents a tiny minority, this relatively new concern for "integration" has spiked in the aftermath of 9/11, but also several incidents of "home grown" terrorism in Europe. In the Dutch context, worries increased following the murder of Theo van Gogh and death threats directed at Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

Chapter seven provides detailed information of family relations. The topics covered here range from (imported) marriage and polygamy, child rearing and divorce, to generation gaps between parents and children, sexuality, adoption and family planning. This section reflects some of the internal contestation within Islam over culture, tradition and degrees of orthodoxy. As their discussion suggests, there continues to be considerable debate among ordinary Muslims over what passes for "Islamic" and

what doesn't, some of this complicated by the fact that many imams continue to receive their training abroad and lack sensitivity to, or prior experience in, the European context. Different answers are yielded by different contexts – both national and local – and also by the different persons involved in this debate.

Finally, chapter eight addresses education. The differences in education law between the two countries are discussed, but the biggest difference in terms of Islamic instruction in schools between the two countries – apart from the sheer number of Dutch Islamic schools – is that Islamic instruction has been widely available in Belgium in its public schools since shortly after the official recognition of Islam in the mid 1970s. The availability of Islamic instruction has also been possible to some degree in Catholic schools in which a majority of students have a Muslim background, often by focusing on stories that the Bible and Koran share in common. Alternatively, there is instructional emphasis on the religious plurality of the Belgian context. These developments help to explain why there have not been increased numbers of Islamic schools in Belgium. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, given the constitutional freedoms to establish schools based on a specific pedagogical philosophy or religious worldview, founding Islamic schools has been the preferred route taken. However, their numbers have leveled off since the late 1990s, and a few schools have been closed down. This book was likely in press at the time that three schools were closed in 2007, at least one of them involving fiscal mismanagement and a scandal over a school "field trip" to Mecca.

Given the comprehensiveness of this book, criticisms are hard to come by. Yet notwithstanding the thorough treatment of their subject, readers familiar with the literature on Islam in either country will not find much that is new here. A lot of research from the 1980s and 1990s is repeated and rehashed. Perhaps this is unavoidable for a book whose aim it is to provide an historical overview of the Islamic presence in Belgium and the Netherlands for close to 50 years. And, to be sure, much of the important development occurred *prior* to 2000. Yet the growing anxieties in Belgium and the Netherlands about its large non-Christian minority, with outspoken proponents of a more restricted immigration policy in both countries (particularly emanating from *Vlaams Belang* and the *Partij voor de Vrijheid*), might have received more treatment, and especially the role of the media. Despite these omissions, this book will provide Dutch language users with a reliable resource covering the essentials of Islam in Belgium and the Netherlands.

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The Ties that Bind: Accommodating Diversity in Canada and the European Union

Edited by *Erik Fossum, Johanne Poirier* and *Paul Magnette*
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009, 362 pp., ISBN 9789052014753.

"The Ties that Bind" is an edited compilation of European and Canadian authors discussing the issue of "Accommodating Diversity" in Canada and the European Union. The analysis employed is both normative and empirical. Certain chapters focus on the normative debate of the merits of accommodating diversity from an ethical, philosophical, and moral point of view. The empirical chapters analyze the causes, consequences, and effectiveness of different policies implemented to this end. Also, certain chapters provide comparative analysis of multiple EU member states, while others focus on one individual country, such as Canada, Britain, and Spain.

The first six chapters (Part I) are concerned with the "diagnostic of diversity," while the last eight chapters (Part II) focus on the "handling of diversity." The first chapter by Bhikhu Parekh is a normative reflection focusing on the diversity resulting from new immigrants, where he uses examples from Britain to illustrate his arguments. Compared to a specific "national" identity (Turkish or Dutch), local/town identities (New Yorker, Rotterdamer, etc.) take root among immigrants much faster, easier, and without causing much conflict (p.46). Local/town identities are based on the real, everyday life of immigrants and natives alike, as opposed to the official constructions or imagined communities. The transformation of the British flag from being a symbol of anti-immigrant xenophobes to being a symbol carried proudly by immigrants to show that they are also part of British society is an interesting experience

to draw upon (p.50). While Parekh states that "not even the most aggressive assimilationist wants to suppress religious freedom," this is probably a "British exception" since there are assimilationists in Continental Europe who want to suppress religious freedoms of immigrants.

In an ingenious and provocative chapter, Melissa Williams weighs arguments of justice and peace in analyzing how politics of fear led to the decline of multiculturalism in Canada, particularly after September 11. She illustrates her argument by using the case of the backlash against the attempt to introduce Sharia-based arbitration of family and inheritance disputes in Ontario. Williams advocates giving deliberative priority to "tolerance" over considerations of peace and security that might otherwise justify suppressing religious freedoms. Hence opting for "presumptive accommodation," which in her view could justify having Sharia-based arbitration courts.

Leslie Seidle discusses the experience of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. This commission was established in Quebec in response to popular demand to discuss the limits of minority accommodations, sparked by controversies over incidents of religious accommodations for Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews. The most compelling aspect of the Commission's work was the establishment of 22 "citizens' forums" in 17 centers throughout Quebec, where several thousand people expressed their opinions publicly about minority accommodations. Seidle argues that the forums would have been more efficient if the participants were previously educated on religious practices of the minorities whose accommodation was being discussed.

Rainer Bauböck tackles the more fundamental question of membership in a political community. He articulates an innovative concept of "stakeholder citizenship." Focusing on non-citizen permanent residents and non-resident citizens, Bauböck suggests that "a principle of stakeholdership in democratic polities requires that immigrants should have a residence-based right to full citizenship and that emigrants should have an option to retain their nationality of origin." (p.125) Bauböck also argues that voting rights for non-citizen residents are compatible with but not required by a democratic principle of inclusion. I found his suggestion that a pure application of "jus domicili," entailing automatic granting and revoking of citizenship based purely on residence, would minimize the mismatch between territorial jurisdiction and citizenship (p.108) original. Paul L.A.H. Chartrand likewise breaks new conceptual ground by developing four types of citizenship based on the historical evolution of the status of aboriginal people in Canada: Citizens minus, citizens equal, citizens plus, and citizens plural. We learn that until 1982, Aboriginals could be deprived of some of their citizenship rights if the Canadian parliament or provincial legislatures chose to do so (p.137). While their status as citizens actually accorded them "citizens equal" status (p.135), the citizenship plus category afforded Aboriginals rights of "historical priority," which meant they had claims to their indigenous land, in addition to all the rights they hold as equal citizens of Canada.

Chartrand argues that even "citizenship plus" is not a fair enough accommodation of Aboriginal claims. Instead, he advocates a conception of "citizens plural," whereby

"indigenous peoples are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination *qua* 'peoples' within the states in which they have their homelands, and also are entitled, *qua* citizens of those states, to the rights, burdens and benefits accruing to all citizens." (p.140) From this perspective, Aboriginals are "sovereign nations" with a relationship to the Canadian state as a separate state and people.

Compared to the other chapters, most of which proposed novel ideas, the chapter by Philippe Van Parijs's chapter titled "Grab a Territory!" does not appear to offer anything new with its suggestion of "linguistic territoriality" as the proper method of accommodating diversity in Europe. It was unclear to this reviewer what, if anything, was new in Parijs' suggestion that every language should assert its primacy in a given territory, since this has been the underlying premise of classical nationalism as well as multinational federalism. As Parijs recognizes, his "linguistic territoriality regime" does not offer any solutions to the vexing problems of diversity: "Which languages are going to be allowed to "grab a territory?" and "[w]hat about the dignity of linguistic communities without a territory to which they could lay a claim.[?]" (p.169).

After discussing "Christianitas" and "nation-states" as previous political identities in Europe, Francisco Colom Gonzalez, in his chapter argues that a comprehensive "reconciliation" can serve as the foundation of a common European identity that can best accommodate diversity, He states, "Modern Europeans need to reconcile with their own historical memory as they need to come to terms among themselves and with the rest of the world for all the global, colo-

nial and civil wars that their ancestors have waged during the last centuries." (p.249)

Daniel Weinstock reflects on the "failed nation-building project" of long-time Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Weinstock argues that the Turdeau's project contains valuable lessons for all countries struggling with questions of accommodating ethno-linguistic diversity through federal and constitutional arrangements. The fact that his ambitious attempt to create a fully bilingual nation with multiculturalism and a "Just Society" as its cultural and economic guiding principles, failed to satisfy the demands of Quebec nationalists does not bode well for those optimistic about democratic management of diversity in a federal framework. Few countries go as far as Canada has gone in designing policies that take into account the country's ethnic, linguistic cultural, and religious diversity, and yet, it was not enough to dampen the secessionist demands of the Quebec nationalists, and according Weinstock, Trudeau's project even fuelled secessionism.

Treating EU and Canada together might be seen as problematic, but the chapters demonstrate some important normative and empirical similarities in the debates on federalism and the accommodation of diversity. Nonetheless, given the 23 official, and many more unofficial, languages spoken in the EU, the level of religious diversity, and the size of EU population, this reviewer thought of India as a federation that is more similar to the EU in its pattern of diversity than Canada. Nonetheless, it appears that Canada accommodates linguistic and religious diversity much better than the individual EU member states discussed in the book. Although normative suggestions such as "stakeholder

citizenship" and "presumptive accommodation" contribute much to our progressive imagination, the book also suggests that the "politics of fear" that has taken over the Western governments since September 11, 2001, dealt a major blow to the accommodation of diversity, leading to a decline of multiculturalist policies in the West.

This book is appropriate for both undergraduate and graduate seminars that deal with ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, and I also recommend it for readers who want to familiarize themselves with Canadian politics and identity.

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The Magna Carta Manifesto

By *Peter Linebaugh*
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, 352 pp., ISBN 9780520260009.

The Magna Carta tradition that has been enshrined in Anglo-American law and celebrated in liberal political culture focuses almost exclusively on the events of 1215, when King John faced his disgruntled barons at Runnymede, acknowledged in a written charter limits to the royal prerogative, and in the immensely influential 39th chapter of the document set precedents for what have come to be considered fundamental liberal rights against the state: due process, trial by jury, *habeas corpus*, and the prohibition against torture. What is much less well known is that two years later, following tumultuous civil war and war with France, the new king, Henry III, only nine years old, in 1217 through his regent reissued the charter, amending it in key respects, and supplemented it with a second charter, the Charter of the Forest, which instantiated substantive rights of subsistence to free men by granting them various privileges within the royal forests. These included the right to have one's livestock pasture and partake of the "common of herbage" for a specified time in the for-

est (*agistment*), the right to have one's pigs access acorns and beech mast (*pannage*), and the right to wood for fuel, repairs, and other necessities (*estovers*). By 1297, Edward I declared both charters part of the common law of England. There was thus not one Great Charter, but two.[1] And if the first grounds our modern notion of human rights, the second stands for the right to access the commons to provide for one's subsistence.

The Charter of the Forest is not, strictly speaking, unknown. One can find it referenced, however briefly, in encyclopedias and in books on the Magna Carta—and of course monographs on medieval forest law treat it too. But Peter Linebaugh's book, *The Magna Carta Manifesto*, persuasively demonstrates that the practical reception of the Magna Carta within Anglo-American legal culture over the last 800 years has routinely ignored or forgotten the principles of commons and subsistence rights, while the individual protections vis-à-vis the state have been canonized. The steady enclosure of common lands, a definitive development of

modern political economy, was paralleled by a shrunken conception of liberty. The US Supreme Court, for example, has long taken it for granted that "Rights of personal liberty and of property…[are] the great principles of Magna Charta."[2] Linebaugh objects to such a narrowing of the legacy of Magna Carta not only in the name of historical accuracy, but because he believes any decent society needs to integrate both liberties: the negative rights against despotism and the positive rights to the conditions for economic self-sufficiency. "The message of the two charters and the message of this book is plain: political and legal rights can exist only on an economic foundation" (6).

However much this critique places the book within a familiar leftist paradigm, it does nothing to diminish its freshness. For one thing, if *The Magna Carta Manifesto* is a kind of communist manifesto, it literalizes communism so that it refers neither to any alleged laws of historical development nor to the necessity of class conflict, but to the cultivation of the *commons*. Linebaugh defines the commons both as the public resources available for private use and, in keeping with the medieval and early modern usage of "common" as a verb, as the set of harmonious social relations produced by individuals jointly extracting the means of their subsistence from a collective pool. While a reader may wish for greater precision regarding the mechanics of commoning rights in England—in particular, clarity as to their extent, legal basis, and purview—what one does get is an immensely rich description of commoning practices that very much supports Linebaugh's central claim about their emancipatory potential and

that contributes to a burgeoning contemporary literature on the reclamation of the commons.[3]

Further, by locating the intellectual resources for commoning and subsistence rights *within* the history of the modern liberal state, Linebaugh suggests that should the sanctity of private property come to be attenuated it likely will be experienced as a return to, rather than radical departure from, the past. Economic justice is often presented as a concern of late modernity—and as something that, if achieved, would herald a new era. T.H. Marshall's influential theory of citizenship, for example, distinguished three successive stages of expanding civic rights—civil, political, and social—and associated each stage with the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries respectively.[4] The pervasiveness of commoning up until the nineteenth century problematizes this evolutionary account. And Linebaugh makes clear that despite the enclosure movement the principles of commoning and the right to subsistence were never eradicated but have continually been rearticulated throughout the long Anglo-American experience, including Kett's Rebellion in 1549 which took aim against enclosure and led to thousands of rebels living in campsites throughout England, the "forty acres and a mule" policy briefly instituted by General William Sherman in the aftermath of the Civil War, and generations of Native Americans who have defended communal land ownership.

In some sense, it is the raw existence of the forest itself—its alternate ecology of wood, not fossil fuels, where individuals play a direct role in obtaining their own subsistence and where pauperism is there-

fore absent—that acts as a topographical reminder of alternatives to the reigning order of commodified labor. Yet this is a possibility that Linebaugh cannot consider at any length, since for him the commons of the woods is above all a historically grounded metaphor—and not the actual paradigm—for formulating present day economic justice. But if Robert Pogue Harrison is right that that the forest is the "shadow of civilization" then perhaps we should expect the communist specter Linebaugh aims to revive as having its most authentic home in the world of the forest.[5] Whereas Marx castigated the "idiocy of the countryside," an unintended result of Linebaugh's analysis is that it suggests that it is in wooded spaces, and above all the forest, that the best chance for commoning lies.

Linebaugh should be commended for the impressive scope of his analysis. It is no easy task to write an 800 year history on such a foundational topic as the inter-relation between juridical and substantive conceptions of justice. Some may be bothered by certain gaps or occasional tendentiousness in the analysis, but it must be remembered that the work is, as its title declares, a manifesto. And this too is a source of its freshness. The joining together of serious historical analysis with a passionate clarity about contemporary injustice is a welcome contribution to a world where historical scholarship is too often divorced, however impossibly, from politics.

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Endnotes

1. Edward Coke's *Institutes of the Laws of England* (1642) could still speak in the plural of the *"Magnae Chartae Libertatum Angliae"*: the great charters of English liberties.

2. *Wilkinson v. Leland* 27 U.S. 657 (1829).

3. See, e.g.., Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

4. *Citizenship and Social Class, and other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

5. Robert Pogue Harrison, *Forests: The Shadow of Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1992.